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Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7
ФОНД // РЕФЕРАТФОНД // РАЗДЕЛ 19 В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · 146 стр. · 145 оцифрованных фрагментов · 332 839 знаков · PDF 7.1 МБ
Анализ Чернобыльской аварии по докладу МАГАТЭ (INSAG-7). Миграция Cs-137 и Sr-90 в почвах и биоценозах, ошибки дезактивации, радиационная защита населения. Таблицы загрязнения и протоколов защиты от радиоактивных осадков.
АвторВ. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ
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Структура тома
Числовые данные и нормативы
The normal core inlet temperature is 270°C and the core outlet temperature is 284°C at a pressure of 7 MPa (approximately 70 atm). · стр. 17
The thermal-hydraulic operating conditions of the core were characterized by a low level of subcooling of the coolant below the boiling temperature (3°C) and a correspondingly low steam quality, which was observed only in the upper part of the core [28]. · стр. 74
Цитаты
The Commission notes that in addition to the aforementioned violations of Articles 3.1.6, 3.1.8, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.5, 3.3.21, 3.3.26, 3.3.28 and 3.3.29 of NSR-04-74, in the design of the RCPS of the RBMK-1000, the design of this system, which is extremely important for ensuring reactor safety, also violated similar requirements of Articles 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 2.2.7, 2.2.8, 2.5.2 and 2.5.8 of GSP-73.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
190 0....20 0.....0...140 0....180 0...140 20 20 ....140 .0......0 0.....0 ,0 0......0 90 0......0 0......0 180 0...:.0 .0 20 20 0...100...170; 20...В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Ni E4.306-440 (1973). [13] rJIABATOM3HEP]TO, TexHmecxoe pemeHHe FnaBaxoMSHepro H opramraaiQui n/x B-2250 no CHCXCMC ooecneieHHsi 6e3onacHOcxH A3C c peaxxopaMH PBMK1000, npoeKXHpyeMbix MHH3Hepro CCCP, or 19 HIOJW 1974 roaa. [14] KAJlVrHH A.K., CeroflHaiiraee noHHMaHHe asapHH, DpHpoaa 11 (1990) 70-77. [15] HAyHHO-HCCJlEflOBATEJILCKHft H KOHCTPyKTOPCKHH HHCTHTVT SHEPrOTEXHHKH, MarepHMW no H3MeHemwM Ha 1 6jioxe J1A3C w KHP 1976 r.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
For reactors with fuel enriched to 1.8% in uranium-235, the experimental data showed that the void coefficient of reactivity increased as a function of fuel burnup and removal of additional absorbers (AA): (a) from -0.22/3eff (211 AA) to + 5.1/3eff (32 AA) at Leningrad Unit 1 [15]; (b) from -0.16j3eff (215 AA) to + 4.9/3eff (39 AA) at Chernobyl Unit 1 [16]; (c) from -0.38/3eff (179 AA) to + 5.3/3eff (40 AA) at Chernobyl Unit 2 [16].В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Ms 864, MocKaa (1987). [22] HAYHHO-HCCJlEflOBATEJlbCKHH H KOHCTPYKTOPCKMll HHCTHTYT 3HEPrOTEXHHKH, OHCbMO, HCX. >fe 050-01/1-120 OT 02.02.84. [23] HAyHHO-HCCJlEflOBATEJIbCKHft H KOHCTPYKTOPCKHft HHCTHTYT 3HEPrOTEXHHKM, OH3HH6CKHH nycK peaKropa PBMK-1500 nepaoro 6noKa HrHaJiHHCKoa A3C, OTICT 12.346 Or (1987). [24] HHCTHTYT ATOMHOfl SHEPPHH MM.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
H ap., CoimajibHOncHxonorHHecKHe HccjieflOBaHH» na HA3C B nepnofl c Maa 1986 no 1987 r., HayqHblft OTHCT OHHJ1 "npOFHOS", 2, O6HHHCK..MAT3 (1987). [5] ABPAMOBA B.H., AsapHH Ha HepHo6bijibCKoH A3C: ncHxojiorHqecKHe ypoxH, 3neprHs: 3KOHOMHxa, TCXKHKE, 3KOJiorH» 3 (1988). [6] ABPAMOBA B.H., ncHxojionnecicoe oSecneneHHe KaapOBOft cjiy»c6bi aroMHOfi 3HeprerHKH (floKTOpCKaa AHCcepraoH)!), O6HHHCK (1990). [7] HHCTHTVT ATOMHOH 3HEPFHM HM.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
NUREG-1251, USNRC, Washington, DC (1987). [39] SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DESIGN INSTITUTE FOR POWER TECHNOLOGY, Startup of the RBMK-1000 Reactor at Units 1 and 2 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant After a Long Term Outage and Nuclear Safety Measures, Programme 12.170 P of 29 June 1986, Moscow. [40] ALL-UNION PRODUCTION GROUP SOYUZATOMEHNERGO, Operating Procedures for Units 3 and 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Moscow (1984). [41] Test Programme for Turbogenerator No.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
J*s 35-877 (1966). [8] IlpaBHna JwepHoft GeaonacHOCTH aroMHbix sneRTpocraHUHft: FIBfl-04-74, ATOMHsaax, MocKsa (1976). [9] O6iime nojiOHceHHfl o6ecne4CHHS GesonacHOCTH aroMHbix 3JieKTpocTaHUHtt npn npoeKTHpOBaHHH, cxpoHTejibCTBe, 3KcnjiyaTaiiHH (OI1B-73), ATOMHsaax, MocKBa (1974). [10] THflPOnPOEKT, KypCKaa, HepHoGbijibCKaa A3C, 2 onepeflb, TexHHqecKHfi npoeKX, HHB.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Then, the neutron field is redistributed, the maximum shifts to the bottom of the core 0....86 0....20 0...240 .0...110 0......0 0....30 0...140 0...120 70...160 0...В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
THIS SAFETY SERIES IS ALSO PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH VIC Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The Chernobyl accident : updating of INSAG-1 : INSAG-7 : a report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. — Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 1992. p. ; 24 cm. — (Safety series, ISSN 0074-1892 ; 75-INSAG-7) STI/PUB/913 ISBN 92-0-104692-8 Includes bibliographical references.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT Time Event 25 April 1986 (time in operating log) 01:06 Start of reactor power reduction; ORM equals 31 manual control rods 03:45 Start of replacement of the nitrogen—helium gas mixture with nitrogen in the gas cooling system for the reactor graphite stack 03:47 Reactor thermal power is 1600 MW from 04:13 Sequential measurement of the control system parameters and until 12:36 vibration characteristics of turbogenerator No.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Kurchatov Institute, Moscow (1986). [4] ABRAMOVA, V.N., et al., Sociopsychological Studies at the Chernobyl Plant from May 1986 to 1987, Prognoz Psychological Research Laboratory 2, Obninsk (1987). [5] ABRAMOVA, V.N., The Chernobyl accident: psychological lessons, Ehnergiya 3 (1988). [6] ABRAMOVA, V.N., Psychological Training of Personnel Working in the Nuclear Power Industry, Doctoral thesis, Obninsk (1990). [7] I.V.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
KypiaTOBa, Mocraa (1987). [47] MEaCflyHAPOflHAfl KOHCVJIbTATHBHAa FPymiA HO BE3OFIACHOCTH, HroroBbifl aoKnaa coBeruaHHa no paccMOTpeHHK) npHHHH H nocjieacTBHH asapHH B HepHo6biJie, Cepiu HsaaHHtt no SesonacHocTH Ms 75INSAG-1, MAFAT3, Bena (1986). [48] ME»CflyHAPOaHAH KOHCyjIBTATHBHAfl TPVnnA HO XffEPHOft BE3OFIACHOCTM, OCHOBHWC npHHunnu GesonacHOCTH aTOMHbix 3neKTpoCT3HUHH, CepHH H3flaHHtt no GesonacHOCTH JMe 75 INSAG-3, MAFAT3, Bena (1988).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
KypnaTOBa, HCX. >fe 33-33/13 (1983). [45] flVBOBCKHH E.T., O (J)3KTOpax HeycroflHHBOCTH aflepHbix peaxxopOB Ha npnMepe peaKTOpa PBMK, VflK 621.039.58, O6HHHCK (1989). [46] BOJIKOB B.n., Hepno6biJibCKax asapiix.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
1st stage Smolensk nuclear power plant; 2nd stage Kursk nuclear power plant; 2nd stage Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Moscow. [12] SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DESIGN INSTITUTE FOR POWER TECHNOLOGY, Technical Safety Report for the RBMK Four Reactor Facility, Reps Nos E4-306-387, E4-306-440, Moscow (1973). [13] GLAVATOMEHNERGO, The Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants with RBMK-1000 Reactors Designed by the USSR Ministry of Power, Tech.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
T6 23:10 Power reduction continued, ORM equals 26 manual control rods 26 April 1986 (time on printout of DREG) 00:05 Reactor thermal power was 720 MW (in operating log) 00:28 At reactor thermal power of about 500 MW transfer made (in operating log) from the local to global main range automatic power control (automatic power controllers Nos 1 and 2).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Ms 333/1-360-89 MocKBa (1989). [32] MHH3HEPFO CCCP/COK)3ATOM3HEPrO, K aKTy paccneflOBaHHH npnqHH aaapHH na 3Hepro6jiOKe Ms 4 HepHoSbiJibCKOft A3C, npOHCineflmefi 26 anpeji» 1986 roaa, HHB.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
3Hepr., 61 5 (1986) 320. [34] "CHIA: MoflejinpOBainie asapmi Ha HA3C", HanHOHanbHafl jiaoopaTOpiw, uiT3T Aftaaxo, nepeBOfl npeanpHHTiM n/a 7755, Ws 92 (1988). [35] AnajiHS paspyuiHTejibHbix CHJI, npHBCflmnx K asapHH Ha HA3C, Nucl.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
It has been reported on the basis of studies made after the accident that the calculated void coefficient of reactivity for the RBMK-1000 reactor extended from -1.3 x 10"4 %'1 (6k/k) void for a fresh fuel load to + (2.0-2.5) X 10"4 %'1 (6k/k) void for the steady state refuelling regime; and that the effect on reactivity of a total loss of coolant was -2/3 for a fresh fuel load and +(4-5)|8 for the steady state refuelling regime (where j3 is the delayed neutron fraction).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Ms 33-08/67 acn (1983). [25] CsoflKbie MeponpHHTHH no noBbimenHio HaaeacHOCTH H 6e3onacnocTH aeHCTByK»uwx H coopyjKaeMbix axoMHbix cTaauHH c peaKTopaMH PBMK, CM-88-PBMK. [26] rijian peannsamiH MeponpHHTHft no nosbiuieHHio SesonacHOCTH A3C c peaKTOpaMH PBMK (1986). [27] HAYHHO-HCCJlEflOBATEJIbCKHH H KOHCTPYKTOPCKHH HHCTHTYT SHEPrOTEXHMKH, O peacHMe Bbi6era, imcbiuo, HCX.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Box 88, Beijing S N T L, Spalena 51, CS-113 02 Prague 1 Alfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3, CS-815 89 Bratislava Office International de Documentation et Librairie, 48, rue Gay-Lussac, F-75240 Paris Cedex 05 Kultura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company, P.O.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
040-04/2571 (1990). [37] KIEV NUCLEAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Computer Modelling of the Dynamic Processes During Nuclear Power Plant Operation, Including Emergency Conditions; Reactivity Variations During Insertion of RCPS Rods into the RBMK-1000 Reactor Core, Kiev (1986). [38] UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Implication of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, Rep.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Ms 33/1-282-88, MocKBa (1988). [30] AKT paccneflOBaHHH npHiHH aeapHH na 3Hepro6noice Ms 4 HepnoGbijibCKOH A3C, npOHcuiefliueft 26.04.86, HA3C, yq.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
This is confirmed by the DREG program, which from 01:19:39 until 01:19:44 and from 01:19:57 until 01:23:30 (i.e. prior to and for a substantial period during the tests) recorded the 'One overcompensation upwards' signal, at which time the automatic control rods could not move into the core.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
MB 53-44, MOCKBH (1980). [17] HAyHHO-HCCJIEflOBATEJIbCKHH H KOHCTPyKTOPCKHfl HHCTHTVT 3HEPrOTEXHHKH, O6omeHHbifi anajins asapHH Ha 4 GJIOKC HA3C, 13.168 Ox, MocKaa (1990).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
This whole issue is discussed in detail in Section 4 of the present report. (6) Steam level protection disabled (01:19:00, 26 April) The recent information suggests that the steam drum protection was changed as early as 00:36 on April 26 and not at 01:19:00 as stated in INSAG-1.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
oo I* CO T3 £ 5 CDO I 4 to TJ 15 "5 3 0.5 0.8 1.1 */<!> (relative units) 1.4 0.5 0.8 1.1 */<t> (relative units) 1.4 FIG.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN OF CHERNOBYL UNIT 4 By a decree of 29 September 1966, the USSR Council of Ministers approved a plan for the introduction of a generating capacity of 11.9 GW at nuclear power plants for the period 1966-1977, including 8 GW at plants with RBMK-1000 reactors.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
The unit's initial condition immediately before the tests at 01:23 was characterized by the following parameters: power of 200 MW(th), ORM (value obtained using the PRIZMA-ANALOG code for the state at 01:22:30) equal to 8 manual control rods, double peaked axial neutron field with a maximum above, coolant flow rate of 56 000 m3/h, feedwater flow rate of 200 t/h and thermophysical parameters close to stable values.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Rep., Moscow (1974). [14] KALUGIN, A.K., A present day understanding of the Chernobyl accident, Priroda [Nature], 11 (1990), 70-77. [15] SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DESIGN INSTITUTE FOR POWER TECHNOLOGY, Documentation on Changes at Unit 1 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant Before and After the 1976 Planned Repair and Maintenance Outage, Rep.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Box 149, H-1389 Budapest 62 Oxford Book and Stationery Co., 17, Park Street, Calcutta-700 016 Oxford Book and Stationery Co., Scindia House, New Delhi-110 001 YOZMOT Literature Ltd., P.O.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
At 01:03 and 01:07, in accordance with Section 2.12 of the testing programme [41], one MCP from each side (MCP Nos 12 and 22) was also switched on "to cool down the reactor during the test." Before 26 April 1986 no document, including the Operating Procedures, prohibited connection of all eight MCPs to the reactor at any power level.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Box 724, Pretoria 0001 Diaz de Santos, Lagasca 95, E-28006 Madrid Diaz de Santos, Balmes 417, E-08022 Barcelona AB Fritzes Kungl.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
JIMTEPATYPA K riPHJIOHCEHHK) I [1] rOCYOAPCTBEHHBIH KOMHTET HO ATOMHOft 3HEPFHH CCCP, ABapmi Ha HA3C H ee nocjieacxsHfl — HHifropMauHfl, noaroxoBJieifflaa ana coseIU3HHH 3KcnepxoB MAFAT3, Bena, 25-29 aBrycra 1986 r., qacxn 1 H 2 (1986). [2] ACMOJ1OB, B.F.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Kurchatov Institute, Moscow (1966). [8] Nuclear Safety Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants, NSR-04-74, Atomizdat, Moscow (1976). [9] General Safety Provisions for the Design, Construction and Operation of Nucler Power Plants (GSP-73), Atomizdat, Moscow (1974). [10] GIDROPROEKT, The Second Stage of the Kursk and Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plants, Technical Design Documentation, Rep.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
2, IAEA, Vienna (1988) 643-652. [50] ABRAMOVA, V.N., A psychologist's view of the Chernobyl accident, Nauka i zhizn' 11 (1989). [51] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Operation, including Commissioning and Decommissioning: A Code of Practice, Safety Series No.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
33/1-282-88, Moscow (1988). [30] Report on the Investigation of the Causes of the Accident at Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on 26 April 1986, Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Rep.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
050-01/1-120 of 2 February 1984. [23] SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DESIGN INSTITUTE FOR POWER TECHNOLOGY, Physical Startup of the RBMK-1500 Reactor at Unit 1 of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Rep.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
In 1990, RBMK plants generated 47.8% (101.0 x 109 kW-h) of the total quantity of nuclear electricity generated in the country (211.5 x 109kW-h).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
In the light of new information regarding positive scram, the statement made under the significance column of Table I in INSAG-1 that "This trip would have saved the reactor" seems not to be valid. (5) Required operating reactivity margin violated (01:00:00, 26 April) The recent reports confirm that the minimum ORM was indeed violated by 01:00:00 on 26 April, and in fact claim that this minimum ORM was also violated for several hours on 25 April.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · цитата по ст. 1274 ГК РФ
Разделы
75-INSAG-7 in LL CO INSAG-7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 A REPORT BY THE IN · стр. 1–10
THIS SAFETY SERIES IS ALSO PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH VIC Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The Chernobyl accident : updating of INSAG-1 : INSAG-7 : a report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. — Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 1992. p. ; 24 cm. — (Safety series, ISSN 0074-1892 ; 75-INSAG-7) STI/PUB/913 ISBN 92-0-104692-8 Includes bibliographical references.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 6
75-INSAG-l (INSAG-1) was prepared by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSA · стр. 11–20
It has been reported on the basis of studies made after the accident that the calculated void coefficient of reactivity for the RBMK-1000 reactor extended from -1.3 x 10"4 %'1 (6k/k) void for a fresh fuel load to + (2.0-2.5) X 10"4 %'1 (6k/k) void for the steady state refuelling regime; and that the effect on reactivity of a total loss of coolant was -2/3 for a fresh fuel load and +(4-5)|8 for the steady state refuelling regime (where j3 is the delayed neutron fraction).В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 13
In fact, sustained operation of the reactor at a power level below 700 MW(th) was not pros · стр. 21–30
This whole issue is discussed in detail in Section 4 of the present report. (6) Steam level protection disabled (01:19:00, 26 April) The recent information suggests that the steam drum protection was changed as early as 00:36 on April 26 and not at 01:19:00 as stated in INSAG-1.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 22
obvious intrinsic value, competent safety analysis helps to create an environment of atten · стр. 31–40
Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the reactor made possible its unstable behaviour. (3) Two earlier accidents at RBMK reactors, one at Leningrad (Unit 1 in 1975) and a fuel failure at Chernobyl (Unit 1 in 1982), had already indicated major weaknesses in the characteristics and operation of RBMK units.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 33
to determine why the actions taken by the personnel caused the disaster, particularly sinc · стр. 41–50
For reactors with fuel enriched to 1.8% in uranium-235, the experimental data showed that the void coefficient of reactivity increased as a function of fuel burnup and removal of additional absorbers (AA): (a) from -0.22/3eff (211 AA) to + 5.1/3eff (32 AA) at Leningrad Unit 1 [15]; (b) from -0.16j3eff (215 AA) to + 4.9/3eff (39 AA) at Chernobyl Unit 1 [16]; (c) from -0.38/3eff (179 AA) to + 5.3/3eff (40 AA) at Chernobyl Unit 2 [16].В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 46
Article 3.3.21 of NSR-04-74 states that: "The reactor control and protection system must i · стр. 51–60
The Commission notes that in addition to the aforementioned violations of Articles 3.1.6, 3.1.8, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.5, 3.3.21, 3.3.26, 3.3.28 and 3.3.29 of NSR-04-74, in the design of the RCPS of the RBMK-1000, the design of this system, which is extremely important for ensuring reactor safety, also violated similar requirements of Articles 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 2.2.7, 2.2.8, 2.5.2 and 2.5.8 of GSP-73.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 56
CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT 1-4.1. · стр. 61–70
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT Time Event 25 April 1986 (time in operating log) 01:06 Start of reactor power reduction; ORM equals 31 manual control rods 03:45 Start of replacement of the nitrogen—helium gas mixture with nitrogen in the gas cooling system for the reactor graphite stack 03:47 Reactor thermal power is 1600 MW from 04:13 Sequential measurement of the control system parameters and until 12:36 vibration characteristics of turbogenerator No.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 63
However, the main events of the accident process were presented in the following way" (see · стр. 71–80
This is confirmed by the DREG program, which from 01:19:39 until 01:19:44 and from 01:19:57 until 01:23:30 (i.e. prior to and for a substantial period during the tests) recorded the 'One overcompensation upwards' signal, at which time the automatic control rods could not move into the core.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 75
Firstly, it is necessary to establish as full a list as possible of all the violations of · стр. 81–90
At 01:03 and 01:07, in accordance with Section 2.12 of the testing programme [41], one MCP from each side (MCP Nos 12 and 22) was also switched on "to cool down the reactor during the test." Before 26 April 1986 no document, including the Operating Procedures, prohibited connection of all eight MCPs to the reactor at any power level.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 87
mum value, but for no longer than three days. · стр. 91–100
Kurchatov Institute, Moscow (1986). [4] ABRAMOVA, V.N., et al., Sociopsychological Studies at the Chernobyl Plant from May 1986 to 1987, Prognoz Psychological Research Laboratory 2, Obninsk (1987). [5] ABRAMOVA, V.N., The Chernobyl accident: psychological lessons, Ehnergiya 3 (1988). [6] ABRAMOVA, V.N., Psychological Training of Personnel Working in the Nuclear Power Industry, Doctoral thesis, Obninsk (1990). [7] I.V.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 99
[32] USSR MINISTRY OF POWER, Addendum to the Report on the Investigation of the Accident a · стр. 101–110
Ni E4.306-440 (1973). [13] rJIABATOM3HEP]TO, TexHmecxoe pemeHHe FnaBaxoMSHepro H opramraaiQui n/x B-2250 no CHCXCMC ooecneieHHsi 6e3onacHOcxH A3C c peaxxopaMH PBMK1000, npoeKXHpyeMbix MHH3Hepro CCCP, or 19 HIOJW 1974 roaa. [14] KAJlVrHH A.K., CeroflHaiiraee noHHMaHHe asapHH, DpHpoaa 11 (1990) 70-77. [15] HAyHHO-HCCJlEflOBATEJILCKHft H KOHCTPyKTOPCKHH HHCTHTVT SHEPrOTEXHHKH, MarepHMW no H3MeHemwM Ha 1 6jioxe J1A3C w KHP 1976 r.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 105
Annex II REPORT BY A WORKING GROUP OF USSR EXPERTS1 Causes and Circumstances of the Accide · стр. 111–120
When the unit was shut down for medium term maintenance, which was scheduled for 25 April 1986, the core contained 1650 fuel assemblies with an average burnup of 10.3 MW-d/kg, one additional absorber, and one empty fuel channel.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 117
Overview of the test programme that led to the accident The accident occurred during rundo · стр. 121–130
190 0....20 0.....0...140 0....180 0...140 20 20 ....140 .0......0 0.....0 ,0 0......0 90 0......0 0......0 180 0...:.0 .0 20 20 0...100...170; 20...В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 129
The Chernobyl accident: distribution of the power density profile over the core volume as · стр. 131–140
Over the period 1986-1990, the welded joints in the 800 mm nominal bore piping and 900 mm nominal bore headers in the circulation circuit were subjected to ultrasonic testing in all units.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 137
The RBMK reactor: efficiency of the emergency protection system. · стр. 141–146
Box 88, Beijing S N T L, Spalena 51, CS-113 02 Prague 1 Alfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3, CS-815 89 Bratislava Office International de Documentation et Librairie, 48, rue Gay-Lussac, F-75240 Paris Cedex 05 Kultura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company, P.O.В. А. Легасов, МАГАТЭ · Чернобыльская авария: анализ и доклады INSAG-7 · стр. 146
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